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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Oxford Health Plans, LLC, and Dr. Ivan Sutter are 
parties to a Primary Care Physician Agreement, drafted by 
Oxford, which contains a broad arbitration clause.  Neither 
the arbitration clause nor any other provision of the 
agreement makes express reference to class arbitration.  
Nevertheless, when a dispute arose regarding Oxford‟s 
alleged failure to make prompt and accurate reimbursement 
payments to participating physicians, an arbitrator construed 
the broad text of the clause to authorize class arbitration.  
Oxford contends that the Supreme Court‟s decision in Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758 (2010), requires vacatur of the award authorizing class 
arbitration.  We disagree, and we will affirm the Order of the 
District Court denying Oxford‟s motion to vacate the award. 
 
I 
 
By their 1998 Primary Care Physician Agreement (the 
“Agreement”), the parties agreed that Sutter would provide 
primary care health services to members of Oxford‟s 
managed care network in exchange for compensation at 
predetermined reimbursement rates.  They also agreed to 
arbitrate their disputes under the Agreement by a clause that 
states: 
 
No civil action concerning any dispute arising 
under this Agreement shall be instituted before 
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any court, and all such disputes shall be 
submitted to final and binding arbitration in 
New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association with one 
arbitrator. 
 
(App. 55). 
 
A dispute arose in April 2002, when Sutter accused 
Oxford of engaging in a practice of improperly denying, 
underpaying, and delaying reimbursement of physicians‟ 
claims for the provision of medical services.  Sutter filed a 
complaint on behalf of himself and a class of health care 
providers against Oxford and other health insurers in New 
Jersey Superior Court, alleging breach of contract and other 
violations of New Jersey law.  Oxford moved to compel 
arbitration of Sutter‟s claims against it under the Agreement.  
Sutter opposed the motion, arguing that referral of the class 
claims to individual arbitration would violate New Jersey 
public policy.  He urged the Superior Court either to refuse to 
enforce the clause or to certify the class before sending the 
claims to arbitration.  In October 2002, the Superior Court 
granted Oxford‟s motion to compel arbitration and ordered 
that all procedural issues, including those of class 
certification, be resolved by the arbitrator. 
 
The parties commenced arbitration before William 
L.D. Barrett and submitted to him the question of whether the 
arbitration clause in their Agreement allows for class 
arbitration.  By memorandum and order dated September 23, 
2003, he determined that it does.  Framing the question as one 
of contract construction, the arbitrator turned first to the text 
of the arbitration clause.  He described the clause as “much 
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broader even than the usual broad arbitration clause;” it was 
“unique in [his] experience and seem[ed] to be drafted to be 
as broad as can be.”  (App. 47).  The arbitrator thus 
determined that the clause‟s first phrase, “No civil action 
concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be 
instituted before any court,” embraces all conceivable court 
actions, including class actions.  Because the clause‟s second 
phrase sends “all such disputes” to arbitration, he reasoned 
that class disputes must also be arbitrated.  Thus, the 
arbitrator concluded that the clause expressed the parties‟ 
intent to authorize class arbitration “on its face.”  (App. 48).  
He observed that an express carve-out for class arbitration 
would be required to negate this reading of the clause.  He 
mused, however, that it would be bizarre for the parties to 
have intended to make class action impossible in any forum.  
Since he found the clause unambiguous, the arbitrator did not 
reach Sutter‟s argument that any ambiguity in the clause 
should be construed against its drafter, Oxford.  The arbitrator 
subsequently incorporated this clause construction into his 
Partial Final Class Determination Award, dated March 24, 
2005. 
 
In April 2005, Oxford filed a motion to vacate the 
award in the District Court, arguing that the arbitrator had 
exceeded his powers and manifestly disregarded the law by 
ordering class arbitration.  The District Court denied Oxford‟s 
motion in October 2005, and a panel of this Court affirmed in 
February 2007.  Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, LLC, No. 05-
CV-2198, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25792 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 
2005), aff’d 227 F. App‟x 135 (3d Cir. 2007).  The arbitration 
thereafter proceeded on a classwide basis. 
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This action represents Oxford‟s second foray into 
federal court to vacate the award authorizing class arbitration 
as in excess of the arbitrator‟s powers.  Since Oxford‟s first 
unsuccessful attempt at vacatur, the Supreme Court decided 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 
S. Ct. 1758 (2010), in which it held that an arbitral panel had 
exceeded its authority by allowing class arbitration when the 
parties had reached no agreement on the issue.  See id. at 
1775.  Oxford contends that Stolt-Nielsen controls this case 
and compels the conclusion that the arbitrator‟s construction 
of the clause was in excess of his powers.  Oxford first moved 
the arbitrator for reconsideration of his clause construction 
award, but the arbitrator distinguished Stolt-Nielsen and 
reaffirmed his construction of the parties‟ clause.  Oxford 
then moved the District Court to vacate the arbitrator‟s most 
recent award or, in the alternative, to reconsider its own 2005 
decision denying vacatur.  The District Court denied Oxford‟s 
motion and granted Sutter‟s cross-motion to confirm the 
award.  Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, LLC, Nos. 05-CV-
2198, 10-CV-4903, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17123 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 22, 2011).  Oxford appeals. 
 
II 
 
The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction over Oxford‟s appeal under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D) (“An appeal may be 
taken from . . . an order . . . confirming or denying 
confirmation of an award or partial award.”).1 
                                                 
1
 Anomalously, the Federal Arbitration Act creates a body of 
federal substantive law without creating any independent 
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On appeal from a district court‟s ruling on a motion to 
confirm or vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal 
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-
48 (1995), aff’g 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir. 1994); China 
Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 
F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
A more deferential standard of review applies to the 
arbitration award itself.  We do not entertain claims that an 
arbitrator has made factual or legal errors.  Rather, mindful of 
the strong federal policy in favor of commercial arbitration, 
we begin with the presumption that the award is enforceable.  
See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).  An award may be vacated only 
upon one of the four narrow grounds enumerated in the 
Federal Arbitration Act: 
 
(1) where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
 
(2) where there was evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
                                                                                                             
federal-question jurisdiction.  Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).  
It does, however, confer appellate jurisdiction, including over 
interlocutory judicial orders.  See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).  In a court 
of competent jurisdiction, assuming ripeness, interlocutory 
arbitral awards on the availability of class arbitration are 
reviewable under the Act.  See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 
1766-67 & n.2. 
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(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made. 
 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  These grounds are exclusive and may not 
be supplemented by contract.  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008), overruling Roadway 
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 
2001).  In sum, when parties agree to resolve their disputes 
before an arbitrator without involving the courts, the courts 
will enforce the bargains implicit in such agreements by 
enforcing arbitration awards absent a reason to doubt the 
authority or integrity of the arbitral forum.  See id. at 586 
(characterizing the exclusive statutory bases for vacatur as 
“egregious departures from the parties‟ agreed-upon 
arbitration”). 
 
The basis for vacatur asserted in this case, § 10(a)(4) 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, permits district courts to 
vacate awards when arbitrators exceed their powers.  
“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not 
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
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Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989).  By contractually restricting the issues they 
will arbitrate, the individuals with whom they will arbitrate, 
and the arbitration procedures that will govern, parties to an 
arbitration agreement may place limits upon the arbitrator‟s 
powers that are enforceable by the courts.  See Puleo v. Chase 
Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
An arbitrator oversteps these limits, and subjects his award to 
judicial vacatur under § 10(a)(4), when he decides an issue 
not submitted to him, grants relief in a form that cannot be 
rationally derived from the parties‟ agreement and 
submissions, or issues an award that is so completely 
irrational that it lacks support altogether.  Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for the 1998 
Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reins. Co., 868 
F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989)).  In other words, the task of an 
arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract.  When he 
makes a good faith attempt to do so, even serious errors of 
law or fact will not subject his award to vacatur.  See 
Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding an arbitration award 
despite the arbitrator‟s inexplicable reliance on language not 
found in the relevant agreement).  But when the arbitrator 
“strays from interpretation and application of the agreement 
and effectively „dispenses his own brand of industrial 
justice,‟” he exceeds his powers and his award will be 
unenforceable.  Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 
504, 509 (2001) (per curiam) (quoting Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))).
2
 
                                                 
2
 Like the Supreme Court, this Court will refer to the federal 
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 An arbitrator may exceed his powers by ordering class 
arbitration without authorization.  In Stolt-Nielsen, the 
Supreme Court held that arbitrators may not infer parties‟ 
consent to class arbitration procedures solely from the fact of 
their agreement to arbitrate.  130 S. Ct. at 1775.  Therefore, 
an arbitrator lacks the power to order class arbitration unless 
there is a contractual basis for concluding that the parties 
agreed to that procedure.  Id. 
 
III 
 
Stolt-Nielsen arose out of a Department of Justice 
investigation which revealed that Stolt-Nielsen and other 
shipping companies were engaged in an illegal price fixing 
conspiracy.  Id. at 1765.  AnimalFeeds and other customers of 
the shipping companies brought class action antitrust 
lawsuits, which were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation.  Id.  AnimalFeeds‟ suit was 
subsequently referred to arbitration on the basis of an 
arbitration clause in the “Vegoilvoy” charter party, a standard 
                                                                                                             
common law developed under Textile Workers Union of Am. 
v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), for 
judicial review of labor arbitration awards under the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to elaborate the 
meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act‟s statutory grounds 
for vacatur.  See Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 
F.2d 1125, 1130 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. Hall St., 552 U.S. 
at 585 (suggesting without deciding that the judicially created 
manifest disregard of law ground for vacatur may be properly 
considered only as a judicial gloss on the statutory grounds); 
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (same). 
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form shipping contract that AnimalFeeds had selected.  Id. at 
1764-65.  When AnimalFeeds then sought to proceed in 
arbitration on a classwide basis, the parties agreed to submit 
the issue of class arbitration to a panel of three arbitrators.  Id. 
at 1765.  After hearing argument and testimony, the 
arbitrators concluded that class arbitration was permitted.  Id. 
at 1766. 
 
Before the arbitrators, the parties stipulated that the 
arbitration clause in the Vegoilvoy charter party was “silent” 
with respect to class arbitration, in the sense that they had not 
reached any agreement on that issue.  Id. at 1766.  “Counsel 
for AnimalFeeds explained to the arbitration panel that the 
term „silent‟ did not simply mean that the clause made no 
express reference to class arbitration.  Rather, he said, „all 
parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there‟s 
been no agreement that has been reached on that issue.‟”  Id.  
Thus, the arbitration clause was silent but “not ambiguous so 
as to call for parol evidence” because “the parties were in 
complete agreement regarding their intent.”  Id. at 1770 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The arbitrators were 
bound to conclude that the parties intended neither to 
authorize nor to preclude class arbitration.  See id. 
 
The parties‟ stipulation left the arbitrators unable to 
apply traditional principles of contract interpretation.  It 
obviously “left no room for an inquiry regarding the parties‟ 
intent, and any inquiry into that settled question would have 
been outside the panel‟s assigned task.”  Id.  Nor could the 
panel construe the text of the arbitration clause because, in 
light of the parties‟ stipulation, “the particular wording of the 
charter party was quite beside the point.”  Id.   
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“Because the parties agreed their agreement was 
„silent‟ in the sense that they had not reached any agreement 
on the issue of class arbitration, the arbitrators‟ proper task 
was to identify the rule of law that governs in that situation.”  
Id. at 1768 (identifying the Federal Arbitration Act, federal 
maritime law, and New York law as possible sources of a 
governing rule).  Instead, the panel based its decision that 
class arbitration was permitted on the parties‟ failure to 
contractually preclude the procedure and on other arbitral 
decisions construing other clauses to allow class arbitration.  
Id.  In so doing, the Supreme Court held, the arbitrators 
impermissibly assumed the power of a common law court to 
fashion a rule of decision.  Id. at 1769.  By doing so, rather 
than interpreting the contract under the governing law, the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of 
§ 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Id. at 1770. 
 
The Supreme Court held that “a party may not be 
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless 
there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 
agreed to do so.”  Id. at 1775 (emphasis in original).  The 
Court therefore faulted the arbitrators for imposing class 
arbitration in the absence of any agreement on the issue and 
on the basis that the parties had not intended to preclude class 
arbitration.  Id.  Although parties may implicitly authorize 
arbitrators to adopt necessary procedures, the Court held that 
“[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action 
arbitration . . . is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely 
from the fact of the parties‟ agreement to arbitrate.”  Id.  
“[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action 
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume . . . that the 
parties‟ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration 
constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class 
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proceedings.”  Id. at 1776; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (further 
articulating the “fundamental” differences between bilateral 
arbitration and class arbitration).
3
 
 
Stolt-Nielsen did not establish a bright line rule that 
class arbitration is allowed only under an arbitration 
agreement that incants “class arbitration” or otherwise 
expressly provides for aggregate procedures.  Stolt-Nielsen, 
130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10; Jock v . Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 
F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that an arbitrator did 
not exceed her powers by ruling that class arbitration was 
allowed under an agreement lacking an express class 
provision).  The Court underscored this point, writing, “We 
have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may 
                                                 
3
 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court 
held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California 
common law rule invalidating class waivers in arbitration 
clauses as unconscionable.  See 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).  
The Court found its decision in Stolt-Nielsen to be 
“instructive.”  Id. at 1750.  Because class arbitration 
necessarily sacrifices the informality, speed, and cost savings 
of arbitration and increases the stakes without increasing the 
level of judicial scrutiny available under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, the Court found “it hard to believe that 
defendants would bet the company with no effective means of 
review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have 
intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”  Id. at 
1752.  Recognizing that parties could agree to class 
arbitration if they so chose, the Court held that this procedure 
may not be required by state law.  Id. at 1752-53. 
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support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-
action arbitration.  Here, as noted, the parties stipulated that 
there was „no agreement‟ on the issue of class-action 
arbitration.”  130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10; see also id. at 1783 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court does not insist on 
express consent to class arbitration.”). 
 
Instead, Stolt-Nielsen established a default rule under 
the Federal Arbitration Act: “[A] party may not be compelled 
under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a 
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do 
so.”  Id. at 1775 (emphasis in original).  Absent a contractual 
basis for finding that the parties agreed to class arbitration, an 
arbitration award ordering that procedure exceeds the 
arbitrator‟s powers and will be subject to vacatur under 
§ 10(a)(4).
4
 
 
IV 
 
 Oxford argues that the clause construction award at 
issue in this case should be vacated because the arbitrator 
                                                 
4
 Thus, the District Court misstated the law when it wrote that 
the arbitrator must decide whether the arbitration clause 
“forbids” class arbitration.  See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, 
LLC, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 17123, at *12 (quoting Vilches v. 
The Travelers Cos., 413 F. App‟x 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2011)).  It 
is evident from the District Court‟s discussion, however, that 
it properly understood that Stolt-Nielsen allows class 
arbitration only where the parties intend to authorize it, as the 
arbitrator found they did in this case.  In any event, upon de 
novo review under the appropriate standard, we conclude that 
the arbitration award stands. 
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exceeded his powers under Stolt-Nielsen.  According to 
Oxford, “the arbitrator found that the arbitration clause 
between Sutter and Oxford is silent on the issue of class 
arbitration, but he went on to conclude that the clause permits 
class arbitration in light of its breadth and the absence of a 
class arbitration exclusion.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 14).  Oxford 
charges that the arbitrator imposed his own default rule, in 
derogation of Stolt-Nielsen and New Jersey law, based on his 
own conceptions of public policy. 
 
 As an initial matter, we reject Oxford‟s attempt to cast 
this case in the mold of Stolt-Nielsen.  The arbitration clause 
in its Agreement does not refer to class arbitration.  Yet it is 
not “silent” in the way that the Vegoilvoy charter party was 
“silent” in Stolt-Nielsen, and Oxford equivocates when it 
suggests otherwise.
5
  No stipulation between Oxford and 
                                                 
5
 Oxford seems to suggest that an arbitration provision is 
“silent” whenever the words “class arbitration” are not 
written into the text of the arbitration clause.  This rule finds 
no support in Stolt-Nielsen.  It would effectively impose on 
all contracting parties an obligation to use the words “class 
arbitration” to signal their intention to authorize class 
arbitration.  But Stolt-Nielsen did not purport to restrict the 
freedom of contracting parties in this way.  Rather, it 
repeatedly emphasized that the fundamental duty of the 
arbitrator and the courts to effectuate parties‟ intentions.  
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773-74.  Oxford‟s approach 
would cabin the freedom of contracting parties, safeguarded 
by the Federal Arbitration Act, to structure their arbitration 
provisions as they see fit.  See id. at 1774 (“Underscoring the 
consensual nature of private dispute resolution, we have held 
that parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
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Sutter is conclusive of the parties‟ intent and, indeed, the 
parties dispute whether or not they intended to authorize class 
arbitration.  Therefore, the arbitrator in this case was not 
constrained to conclude that the parties did not intend to 
authorize class arbitration or, on the other hand, to identify a 
contrary default rule of New Jersey law.  Cf. Stolt-Nielsen, 
130 S. Ct. at 1769-70.  His decision to order class arbitration 
is within his authority so long as it stands on a contractual 
basis.  See id. at 1775. 
 
 As Oxford concedes, the arbitrator did articulate a 
contractual basis for his decision to order class arbitration.  
Appropriately, the arbitrator made first resort to the text of the 
arbitration clause: 
 
No civil action concerning any dispute arising 
under this Agreement shall be instituted before 
any court, and all such disputes shall be 
submitted to final and binding arbitration in 
New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association with one 
arbitrator. 
 
(App. 55).  He reasoned that the clause‟s first phrase, “No 
civil action concerning any dispute arising under this 
Agreement shall be instituted before any court,” is broad 
enough to include class actions.  Thus, its second phrase, “and 
all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding 
arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator,” sends 
                                                                                                             
agreements as they see fit.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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all conceivable civil actions—including class actions—to 
arbitration.  In other words, the phrase “no civil action . . . 
shall be instituted in any court” meant that a class action may 
not be instituted in a court of law.  “All such disputes” must 
go to arbitration. 
 
 Oxford attacks the contractual basis for the arbitrator‟s 
decision by asserting that the arbitrator‟s purported 
examination of the parties‟ intent was pretext for the 
imposition of his policy preferences.  See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 
S. Ct. at 1769-70 (concluding that the arbitral panel had 
impermissibly imposed its preferred policy notwithstanding 
its references to the parties‟ intent, where the parties 
stipulated that they had formed no intent).  According to 
Oxford, if the arbitrator were actually desirous of determining 
the parties‟ intent, he would have sought it not in the text of 
their agreement to arbitrate but instead in their briefing before 
the New Jersey Superior Court.  In that forum, Sutter opposed 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement on the ground that it 
would send the dispute to individual arbitration, which, he 
argued, would be contrary to New Jersey public policy.  
Oxford argues that Sutter‟s submissions to the Superior 
Court, together with Oxford‟s own representations that its 
Agreement did not contemplate arbitration on a classwide 
basis, were tantamount to a stipulation that the parties did not 
intend to authorize class arbitration.  Cf. id. at 1766. 
 
 Oxford‟s argument lacks force because Sutter‟s 
litigation position in the Superior Court is not conclusive, or 
even particularly probative, of the meaning of a clause drafted 
solely by Oxford.  Cf. id. at 1775 (relying on the stipulation of 
the sophisticated business entity that had selected the charter 
party).  We observe, further, that Sutter‟s litigation position 
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was not uniform: Sutter alternatively urged the Superior 
Court to certify the class before sending the claims to 
arbitration, and he argued before the arbitrator that the clause 
could be construed to affirmatively authorize class arbitration.  
Without a conclusive statement of the parties‟ intent or clear 
evidence of arbitral overreaching, we must conclude that the 
arbitrator performed his duty appropriately and endeavored to 
give effect to the parties‟ intent.  In this light, Oxford‟s 
allegations of pretext are simply dressed-up arguments that 
the arbitrator interpreted its agreement erroneously. 
 
 The remainder of Oxford‟s arguments are similarly 
uncognizable claims of factual and legal error.  In particular, 
Oxford argues that the arbitrator improperly inferred the 
parties‟ intent to authorize class arbitration from the breadth 
of the parties‟ arbitration agreement and from its failure to 
preclude class arbitration.  In his clause construction award, 
the arbitrator remarked that the parties‟ arbitration clause was 
unique in its breadth.  Construing the broad text and structure 
of the clause, he concluded that the parties affirmatively 
intended to authorize arbitration on a classwide basis.  Then, 
given his construction of the clause, the arbitrator noted that 
an express exception for class arbitration would be required to 
carve out and prohibit class arbitration.  Oxford submits that 
the arbitrator thereby relied on two grounds that Stolt-Nielsen 
had expressly proscribed. 
 
 The arbitrator unquestionably relied on the breadth of 
the arbitration agreement, but Stolt-Nielsen does not proscribe 
such reliance.  Rather, it acknowledges the relevance of an 
arbitration agreement‟s breadth to the determination of 
whether it authorizes class arbitration.  In Stolt-Nielsen, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration panel “imposed 
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its own conception of sound policy” in derogation of its duty 
to interpret the arbitration agreement and apply the law.  130 
S. Ct. at 1769.  The Court acknowledged indications that were 
arguably contrary to its conclusion: The panel had referred to 
the parties‟ intent and had commented on the breadth of the 
arbitration agreement.  Id. at 1770.  But the Court nonetheless 
held that these references and comments could not overcome 
the parties‟ stipulation that they had reached no agreement on 
the issue of class arbitration.  In light of the parties‟ 
stipulation, “the panel had no occasion to ascertain the 
parties‟ intention” and “the particular wording of the charter 
party was quite beside the point.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The lesson from this discussion is that 
where, as here, the parties‟ intent with respect to class 
arbitration is in question, the breadth of their arbitration 
agreement is relevant to the resolution of that question. 
 
 Stolt-Nielsen does prohibit an arbitrator from inferring 
parties‟ consent to class arbitration solely from their failure to 
preclude that procedure, but the arbitrator did not draw the 
proscribed inference in this case.  Rather, the arbitrator 
construed the text of the arbitration agreement to authorize 
and require class arbitration.  Then he observed that an 
express carve-out for class arbitration would have made it 
unavailable even under the clause‟s otherwise broad 
language.  As the arbitrator later articulated when he revisited 
his construction of the clause in light of Stolt-Nielsen, the lack 
of an express exclusion was merely corroborative of his 
primary holding that the parties‟ clause authorized class 
arbitration; it was not the basis of that holding.  Thus, the 
arbitrator did not impermissibly infer the parties‟ intent to 
authorize class arbitration from their failure to preclude it. 
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 We are satisfied that the arbitrator endeavored to 
interpret the parties‟ agreement within the bounds of the law, 
and we cannot say that his interpretation was totally 
irrational.  Nothing more is required under § 10(a)(4) of the 
Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
V 
 
 Because the arbitrator did not exceed his powers by 
construing the parties‟ arbitration agreement to authorize 
class arbitration, we will affirm the Order of the District 
Court. 
